Text/HTML
Text/HTML
If you are a registered user please log in to see more postings.
 

The AAO Weblog covers accounting issues and current events as they relate the practice of investment analysis.

 
 
Aug 30

Written by: Jack Ciesielski
8/30/2005 7:12 AM 

Plenty of attention will be focused on the KPMG settlement, complete with navel-gazing contemplation of what it means for the future of the firm. Hey, I'm guilty of it myself - see yesterday's post. And I'm sure I'll do it again, maybe even before I finish this post.

Still, there are other interesting news nuggets out there. One of them: yesterday, the SEC settled fraud charges with four principal officers of Waste Management for a cool $30.8 million. The quartet included Dean Buntrock, the founder of Waste Management and its chairman and CEO for much of the time the frauds occurred. Waste Management, if you'll recall was kind of the grand-daddy of the 1990's accounting frauds - and an ominous precursor of Arthur Andersen's fate. Andersen may have killed itself with Enron, but it didn't cover itself with glory in its audits of Waste Management, either. And most obviously, Andersen's managers didn't learn many lessons from the Waste Management audits.

"The Commission alleged that, beginning in 1992 and continuing into 1997, defendants engaged in a systematic scheme to falsify and misrepresent Waste Management's financial results with profits being overstated by $1.7 billion. The fraud resulted in a restatement in February 1998, which at the time was the largest restatement in history." [Emphasis added.]

Think about it: Andersen doesn't get tough on Waste Management monkeyshines over a five-year stretch. The result is the largest restatement in history - with profits overstated by nearly $2 billion. (In fact, if memory serves me correctly, there were multiple restatements.) And Andersen sleeps right through the wake-up call: Waste Management's gig was up two and a half years before Enron self-destructed. There was enough time for Andersen to see how many rats were in its basement, but nobody bothered to open the door.

Some of the misdeeds charged against the four principals (which, of course, were settled without admission or denial):

- Waste Management manipulated its depreciation expense by extending the useful lives and overstating the salvage value of its trucks and containers, thus reducing current depreciation charges.

- The firm didn't write off impaired assets; it improperly capitalized interest and other current expenses.

- The firm understated its income tax expenses, under-accrued reserves, gamed its acquisition accounting methods, and brought "cookie-jar" reserves into earnings.

The net effect of these maneuvers: increased current earnings while deferring costs. Tastes great, less filling - but what a hangover. Andersen got past its hangover, and partied on for a few more years. But that's all. Perhaps there's a reminder for KPMG's managers in the timing of the Waste Management settlement with KPMG's own: you just don't get in trouble for taking the high road. It would be refreshing if someone got the message.

Tags:
 

Pension & Other Benefit Plans: A Look Ahead


    Investors in firms with defined benefit pension plans always face the risk of suddenly being pushed farther back in line when it comes to being served their returns. Variability in plan assets and variability in benefit plan obligations are the reason: poor asset returns coupled with sinking interest rates always spell tough times for defined benefit plan funding. In that regard, this year’s asset returns combined with the Fed’s “Operation Twist” add up to “Operation Agony” for defined benefit pension plans. If trends continue along their current path, firms that may have anticipated moving to more realistic pension accounting - like Honeywell, AT&T and Verizon already have done - might forego that decision. It could be just too painful. 

    Pensions aren’t the only kind of benefit plan affected by Operation Twist. Other postemployment benefit (OPEB) plans share much the same accounting model as pensions, including the calculation of a projected benefit obligation that similarly incorporates a discount rate - one that will also be affected by Operation Twist. The net OPEB obligations were slightly less than pension obligations at the end of 2010, but also promise to grow in 2011. Investors perceive them as less threatening than pension obligations because they don’t require funding. Strangely, there are a number of firms that are recognizing income from these benefit plans - without ever creating a dime of cash for investors.

A recent edition of The Analyst’s Accounting Observer dissects these issues, and is available only to paid subscribers. A condensed version is available for free upon request. To receive it, send an e-mail to Brenda Rappold at brappold@accountingobserver.com, with “PENSIONS” in the subject line.

For information about subscribing to The Analyst’s Accounting Observer, click here.