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The AAO Weblog covers accounting issues and current events as they relate the practice of investment analysis.

 
 
May 24

Written by: Jack Ciesielski
5/24/2006 7:07 AM 

Yesterday, the Fannie Mae report was issued by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight.

At 348 pages, it's going to have to wait a while to be read. (Like I said in previous post - king-sized Accounting Observer piece is in the works.) A quick grasp of the accounting importance in the report can be found in the SEC lawsuit charging Fannie managers with fraudulent accounting:

"... the Commission alleged that Fannie Mae failed to comply with the accounting requirements of Statement of Accounting Standards (SFAS) 91, which requires companies to recognize loan fees, premiums and discounts as an adjustment over the life of the applicable loans. In the fourth quarter of 1998, by not recording the full adjustment required by SFAS 91, Fannie Mae understated its expenses and overstated its income by a pre-tax amount of $199 million. Management's decision to book an amount significantly less than the adjustment amount required by SFAS 91 resulted in the company not only exceeding Wall Street expectations, but also hitting the earnings per share target necessary to trigger maximum bonuses. In the periods that followed, Fannie Mae made other departures from SFAS 91, including the implementation of a SFAS 91 Policy in 2000. Fannie Mae's SFAS 91 Policy used a "precision threshold" to determine the SFAS 91 adjustment amount the company would record. There is no support for the use of a threshold in SFAS 91. Implementation of the Policy led to misstatements of SFAS 91 amortization in all periods from the fourth quarter of 2000 through the second quarter of 2004. The Commission alleges that, on at least one occasion, Fannie Mae booked income when it was within its own Policy threshold, with the effect of meeting its earnings targets.

The Commission's Complaint also alleges that Fannie Mae failed to comply with the accounting requirements of SFAS 133, which governs the accounting for derivative instruments and hedging activities. Fannie Mae disregarded the requirements of SFAS 133 and qualified transactions for certain hedge accounting treatment based on erroneous interpretations and an unjustified reliance on materiality. By failing to comply with the requirements of SFAS 133, the company failed to qualify for hedge accounting. This failure led to the company issuing materially false and misleading financial statements for the periods covering the first quarter of 2001 through the second quarter of 2004. The vast majority of the anticipated restatement of at least an $11 billion reduction of previously reported net income is a result of Fannie Mae's improper hedge accounting.”


There were other accounting transgressions mentioned in the suit, but these were the main issues.

You can bet that the SEC learned a lot about the "practical application" by registrants of SFAS 91 and SFAS 133 during the study of Fannie's accounting. Maybe it wouldn't be a bad idea to take a break from the options backdating thrash to see which companies in your portfolio include SFAS 91 and SFAS 133 as part of their critical accounting policies. It might become more critical in the months ahead.

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Pension & Other Benefit Plans: A Look Ahead


    Investors in firms with defined benefit pension plans always face the risk of suddenly being pushed farther back in line when it comes to being served their returns. Variability in plan assets and variability in benefit plan obligations are the reason: poor asset returns coupled with sinking interest rates always spell tough times for defined benefit plan funding. In that regard, this year’s asset returns combined with the Fed’s “Operation Twist” add up to “Operation Agony” for defined benefit pension plans. If trends continue along their current path, firms that may have anticipated moving to more realistic pension accounting - like Honeywell, AT&T and Verizon already have done - might forego that decision. It could be just too painful. 

    Pensions aren’t the only kind of benefit plan affected by Operation Twist. Other postemployment benefit (OPEB) plans share much the same accounting model as pensions, including the calculation of a projected benefit obligation that similarly incorporates a discount rate - one that will also be affected by Operation Twist. The net OPEB obligations were slightly less than pension obligations at the end of 2010, but also promise to grow in 2011. Investors perceive them as less threatening than pension obligations because they don’t require funding. Strangely, there are a number of firms that are recognizing income from these benefit plans - without ever creating a dime of cash for investors.

A recent edition of The Analyst’s Accounting Observer dissects these issues, and is available only to paid subscribers. A condensed version is available for free upon request. To receive it, send an e-mail to Brenda Rappold at brappold@accountingobserver.com, with “PENSIONS” in the subject line.

For information about subscribing to The Analyst’s Accounting Observer, click here.