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The AAO Weblog covers accounting issues and current events as they relate the practice of investment analysis.

 
 
Jul 27

Written by: Jack Ciesielski
7/27/2007 4:04 AM 

About a month ago, House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank sent a letter to SEC Chairman Christopher Cox asking for clarification on whether renegotiation of subprime loan terms (before default) would spoil a "sale treatment" on a securitization. The concern is that perhaps lenders have been a bit starchy about helping out borrowers who have turned out to be subprime repayers. The lenders may have been afraid of having too much involvement, beyond the typical servicing of loans, with a supposedly "autopilot" securitization trust - and perhaps having to undo the sale of the loans. That would put assets and obligations back on their balance sheet.

On Tuesday, the SEC responded to Representative Frank: no problem. Based on the SEC's request, the FASB held an educational forum on June 22 with about 30 participants. As a result of the forum, the SEC concluded: "There was general agreement among participants at the FASB educational forum that, subject to certain constraints, the ability to restructure mortgages when default is reasonably foreseeable is an activity that is not inconsistent with the notion of continued off-balance sheet accounting treatment...[W]orking out a loan where default is reasonably foreseeable is similar to the discretion required when a loan becomes delinquent or default has occurred. When a loan is delinquent or when default has occurred, FAS 140 implementation guidance provides that a servicer may have discretion in restructuring or working out a loan, subject to certain limitations, without calling into question off-balance sheet treatment for the loan.

Currently, the Commission's staff does not believe that additional interpretive guidance is necessary in order to clarify the application of FAS 140 to the contemplated types of securitized mortgage loan work-out activities..."


So far, everyone gets what they wanted. Barney Frank gets the exemption he sought. Borrowers might get more slack from lenders who won't be afraid of jeopardizing their sale accounting treatment. The SEC doesn't have to issue any more prescriptive interpretation than this, and the FASB doesn't add anything to its agenda. In deferring to clients on securitization conflicts, auditors can point to Conrad Hewitt's memo as a guideline for not pushing for re-recognition of assets and obligations.

Hey - is this principles-based accounting great or what?

Are investors worse off because of this decision? Maybe. If you take the strict view that these things never should be accounted for as sales, you'll be unhappy any time sales treatments are preserved. But there is also justification for the view that servicers of the securitizations can have some latitude in working out these arrangements - the question is how much of that latitude gets back into really managing the assets once again, and that's something of a facts-and-circumstances kind of judgment to make.

Where the damage might really be done to investors: if there are no consistent consequences for accounting with mediocre accountability (contorting the idea of "ongoing activity" to fit into a pattern that won't ruin sale treatment), then there's no incentive for issuers to stop making loans to poor credits that they package into securities, fob off on someone else, and not have to re-recognize when the underlying loans meet the wall. Weak accounting reinforces weak lending behavior.

Renegotiating the already-bad loans out there might just be like the little Dutch boy plugging the leaky dike with his finger. It's not likely that it will end the subprime problems. So why keep up the facade in the accounting?

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Pension & Other Benefit Plans: A Look Ahead


    Investors in firms with defined benefit pension plans always face the risk of suddenly being pushed farther back in line when it comes to being served their returns. Variability in plan assets and variability in benefit plan obligations are the reason: poor asset returns coupled with sinking interest rates always spell tough times for defined benefit plan funding. In that regard, this year’s asset returns combined with the Fed’s “Operation Twist” add up to “Operation Agony” for defined benefit pension plans. If trends continue along their current path, firms that may have anticipated moving to more realistic pension accounting - like Honeywell, AT&T and Verizon already have done - might forego that decision. It could be just too painful. 

    Pensions aren’t the only kind of benefit plan affected by Operation Twist. Other postemployment benefit (OPEB) plans share much the same accounting model as pensions, including the calculation of a projected benefit obligation that similarly incorporates a discount rate - one that will also be affected by Operation Twist. The net OPEB obligations were slightly less than pension obligations at the end of 2010, but also promise to grow in 2011. Investors perceive them as less threatening than pension obligations because they don’t require funding. Strangely, there are a number of firms that are recognizing income from these benefit plans - without ever creating a dime of cash for investors.

A recent edition of The Analyst’s Accounting Observer dissects these issues, and is available only to paid subscribers. A condensed version is available for free upon request. To receive it, send an e-mail to Brenda Rappold at brappold@accountingobserver.com, with “PENSIONS” in the subject line.

For information about subscribing to The Analyst’s Accounting Observer, click here.