Text/HTML
Text/HTML
If you are a registered user please log in to see more postings.
 

The AAO Weblog covers accounting issues and current events as they relate the practice of investment analysis.

 
 
Jun 27

Written by: Jack Ciesielski
6/27/2007 2:32 AM 

Yesterday, the SEC settled charges with International Business Machines for a sham transaction conducted with Dollar General in 1999 and 2000. It's a good reminder of the Wild, Wild 1990's because it contains many ingredients of the accounting games of those days: pay incentives that could be gamed through accounting manipulation, loans disguised as revenues, side agreements and avoidance of writedowns.

Where to begin? The SEC's complaint in the matter would help. It seems that in 1999, an enterprising IBM executive by the name of Kevin Collins persuaded Dollar General to lease new cash registers from IBM for $10 million over a few years. Not good enough: he wanted to accelerate the transaction through the end of 2000 - when it would have a favorable effect on IBM revenues AND his bonus. Dollar General balked because the acceleration of the register rollout would force them to write down the existing registers and take a charge. This became known as their "book value" problem.

Collins hatched a plan for IBM to "buy" the cash registers back from Dollar General, and work the buyback price into the contract for the new registers, effectively doubling the price of the new computers from $10 million to $20.5 million. Given that there was no real purchase of the old registers and no intent to do anything with them after the "purchase;" the incremental dollars in the lease contract were really a loan, not revenue. IBM presented the transactions properly in their financials, but certain individuals benefited from having their bonuses calculated on the higher figure. One of them was Collins: 50% of his bonus was attributable to the Dollar General gig. As for Dollar General, the transaction enabled them to report pretax income 6.5% higher than it should have been stated.

In the end, Collins agreed to the entry of a final judgment permanently enjoining him from "aiding and abetting violations" like these, and subject to court approval, will pay $95,000 in fines, interest and penalties.

How about IBM? In a separate proceeding, they were found to have kept inaccurate books and records of their own - for more than just the Dollar General transaction. According to the administrative proceeding, "in the United States, and at least 23 other countries, IBM made at least $200 million in revenue recognition errors in its fiscal year 2000, and at least $377 million in revenue recognition errors in its fiscal year 2001. At least $281 million of this revenue involved the use of side letters, a substantial portion of which were side letters in which IBM granted rights of return." Pretty unnerving stuff. Many of the errors related to recognition between quarters and were corrected before the SEC investigation of the Dollar General deals. No real punishment meted out to IBM for this, just the usual "cease-and-desist" action.

Tags:
 

Pension & Other Benefit Plans: A Look Ahead


    Investors in firms with defined benefit pension plans always face the risk of suddenly being pushed farther back in line when it comes to being served their returns. Variability in plan assets and variability in benefit plan obligations are the reason: poor asset returns coupled with sinking interest rates always spell tough times for defined benefit plan funding. In that regard, this year’s asset returns combined with the Fed’s “Operation Twist” add up to “Operation Agony” for defined benefit pension plans. If trends continue along their current path, firms that may have anticipated moving to more realistic pension accounting - like Honeywell, AT&T and Verizon already have done - might forego that decision. It could be just too painful. 

    Pensions aren’t the only kind of benefit plan affected by Operation Twist. Other postemployment benefit (OPEB) plans share much the same accounting model as pensions, including the calculation of a projected benefit obligation that similarly incorporates a discount rate - one that will also be affected by Operation Twist. The net OPEB obligations were slightly less than pension obligations at the end of 2010, but also promise to grow in 2011. Investors perceive them as less threatening than pension obligations because they don’t require funding. Strangely, there are a number of firms that are recognizing income from these benefit plans - without ever creating a dime of cash for investors.

A recent edition of The Analyst’s Accounting Observer dissects these issues, and is available only to paid subscribers. A condensed version is available for free upon request. To receive it, send an e-mail to Brenda Rappold at brappold@accountingobserver.com, with “PENSIONS” in the subject line.

For information about subscribing to The Analyst’s Accounting Observer, click here.