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The AAO Weblog covers accounting issues and current events as they relate the practice of investment analysis.

 
 
Jan 28

Written by: Jack Ciesielski
1/28/2005 9:11 AM 

In the last few years, there's a condition that's afflicted many analysts and investors: its acronym is PDHD, standing for "Pension Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder." Those afflicted with it often foam at the mouth, moaning loudly and frequently upon realizing that firms they're interested in might be forced to fork over cash to fund underfunded defined benefit pension plans. It's a serious condition for both the firm and its investors.

Do not confuse this condition with PPHD: Padded Pension Hyperactivity Disorder. The symptoms are similar - foamy oral orifice, loud moaning - but you must pay attention to the moaned message to distinguish PPHD from PDHD. With PPHD, investors and analysts find themselves out of sorts because a firm has an overfunded pension plan that contributes non-cash earnings in the consolidated earnings picture, and more commonly, are concerned about the effects of cheery pension asset earnings assumptions on consolidated earnings.

(I speak from experience: I've had both. I've always handled it by spending more time with stock option disclosures. But that leads to other conditions, whose symptoms can be worse.)

Investors and analysts afflicted with these conditions are not necessarily hypochondriacs. And now, there's some solid empirical evidence that those afflicted with PPHD are really fairly accurate in their perceptions of the world.

It's not light reading, but if you suffer from PPHD, it's worth downloading "Earnings Manipulation, Pension Assumptions and Managerial Investment Decisions." Authored by Daniel Bergstresser, Mihir Desai, (both of Harvard) and Josua Rauh (MIT), the study shows that:

"Managers appear to manipulate firm earnings when they characterize pension assets to capital markets and alter investment decisions to justify, and capitalize on, these manipulations. Managers are more aggressive with assumed long-term rates of return when their assumptions have a greater impact on reported earnings. Managers also increase assumed rates of return as they prepare to acquire other firms and as they exercise stock options, further confirming the opportunistic nature of these increases ... Taken together, these results suggest that opportunistic earnings manipulation influences significant managerial investment decisions." (From the abstract)

The methodology is perhaps more than you'd care to hack through - but suffice it to say, it was not based on a spurious selection of limited data. There was interesting focus on IBM during the Lou Gerstner years in the paper, as well.

The author's findings should at least make those suffering from PPHD confident that the problem is not all in their heads.

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Pension & Other Benefit Plans: A Look Ahead


    Investors in firms with defined benefit pension plans always face the risk of suddenly being pushed farther back in line when it comes to being served their returns. Variability in plan assets and variability in benefit plan obligations are the reason: poor asset returns coupled with sinking interest rates always spell tough times for defined benefit plan funding. In that regard, this year’s asset returns combined with the Fed’s “Operation Twist” add up to “Operation Agony” for defined benefit pension plans. If trends continue along their current path, firms that may have anticipated moving to more realistic pension accounting - like Honeywell, AT&T and Verizon already have done - might forego that decision. It could be just too painful. 

    Pensions aren’t the only kind of benefit plan affected by Operation Twist. Other postemployment benefit (OPEB) plans share much the same accounting model as pensions, including the calculation of a projected benefit obligation that similarly incorporates a discount rate - one that will also be affected by Operation Twist. The net OPEB obligations were slightly less than pension obligations at the end of 2010, but also promise to grow in 2011. Investors perceive them as less threatening than pension obligations because they don’t require funding. Strangely, there are a number of firms that are recognizing income from these benefit plans - without ever creating a dime of cash for investors.

A recent edition of The Analyst’s Accounting Observer dissects these issues, and is available only to paid subscribers. A condensed version is available for free upon request. To receive it, send an e-mail to Brenda Rappold at brappold@accountingobserver.com, with “PENSIONS” in the subject line.

For information about subscribing to The Analyst’s Accounting Observer, click here.